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

A

WORD OR TWO ABOUT THE WAR.

BY

LEWIS BEACH.

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A WORD OR TWO ABOUT THE WAR.

THERE is a question which every one is now asking, but which no one answers: What's to be the end of all this?

The object of the present paper is not so much to answer this difficult query as to suggest matters of fact that will *lead* to a satisfactory answer.

Our Future? What is it to be? Is the integrity of our Government to be preserved? This is *the* question of the present hour; a question, the very importance and interest of which, at this critical period, engrosses the attention of every American, and furnishes ample apology, if any be necessary, for our feeble attempt to anticipate the march of Time, and seek an answer to our fears and hopes, from the Arcana of the future.

We are engaged in a mighty war. *Not* a foreign war, which to the body politic is like the *heat* of corporal exercise, but a civil war, which is like the *heat* of some consuming fever. History teaches us that a Civil War is invariably waged with unusual ferocity and followed

by unusual national prostration. These two symptoms, the degree of ferocity and extent of prostration, are the distinguishing marks of a Civil War. We cannot claim that the contest in which we are now engaged will prove an exception to the experience of all past ages. It is a lamentable fact that during this struggle, acts of barbarism have been perpetrated that would be in themselves an indelible disgrace upon the Middle Ages; and on the other hand, it may be safely predicted, that when our present difficulties are ended, as ended they *must be*, sooner or later, a general prostration will ensue, such as no other country or age has experienced.

The questions so much argued at the beginning of this strife, as to whether the South had a constitutional right to secede—whether the States, individually, were the arbiters of the delegated and reserved rights, or whether such arbitrament appertained to the Supreme Court, and a host of similar questions discussed on the floors of Congress and by the Press at large, only served to display the argumentative accomplishments of the disputants, without effecting any practical good. There was no use then—more than there is now, of disguising the fact that we are engaged in a mighty Civil War. History will call it Rebellion, if crushed; but Revolution, if successful. If crushed, the leaders will be stamped as traitors; if successful, they will be apotheosized as heroes.

It is equally useless for us to repine over the want of a sufficient cause in the South for their conduct. The Schoolmen of old claimed that nothing short of an actual encroachment would render a nation justifiable in resorting to arms; but the practice of more recent times,

as well as common sense, recognize the *just fear of some imminent peril* as a *casus belli*. The example set us by Henry VIII. of England, Francis I. of France, and the Emperor Charles V., is to the point. These three monarchs, during their lengthy reigns, were engaged in constant warfare. One of them could not acquire an inch of ground but the other two would confederate together to wrest it from him. And this, but to maintain that great bugbear in European politics, but unknown in this country, "the Balance of Power."

Nor is there any use in investigating the cause of this war, except so far as may be necessary to end it and prevent its recurrence.

It is equally idle to discuss how it might have been prevented, though all of us have pretty strong opinions upon this point. When the question, how could this war have been prevented, is asked, History will calmly point her finger to the answer of Appolonius to Vespasian. Vespasian asked him (Appolonius) what was the cause of Nero's overthrow? He answered: Nero could touch and tune the harp well, but in government sometimes he used to wind the pins too high—sometimes to let them down too low. Whether the immediate predecessors of our present Executive possessed Nero's musical accomplishments is not known, but that they had his governmental defect can never be the subject of serious doubt.

The question is not as to the justice or cause of this war, or how it could have been prevented, but simply how it can be honorably ended, and to this we commit ourselves.

It seems to us that the only policy is to draw

the sword and throw the scabbard away. Strike sure, but strike quickly. If the avalanche that impends over us *is* to fall, burying in its ruins the last hope of Liberty, let it come. The dreadful suspense is worse than the reality. Better a dozen reverses and a final, conclusive victory, than a dozen successes but partial in effect. Better lose ten thousand lives in one battle than fritter away twenty thousand in ten. Better spend five hundred millions in one year than a thousand millions in three. Better in political (as it is in domestic life) to have a pitched battle and end the dispute, than wrangle from day to day. "Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath." By which is meant, get wroth as you please, but free yourself from the baneful passion as soon as you can. If this policy had been pursued, the chances of an amicable re-adjustment of federal relations would have been much more favorable than they now are. Every hour that this unnatural strife is prolonged increases that embittered sectional jealousy which was one of its main causes.

There is one point upon which there is or should be no disagreement among all true loyalists, and that is, that now to retreat would be worse than to go on. We must defeat the army that surrounds the rebel capital. Richmond must fall, even as Troy fell. Once in possession of the rebel city to whose defence the insurgents have summoned all their aid, and upon the stand or fall of which they have staked their cause, a new, delicate, but all-important question arises: What are we then to do?

There are some who believe that upon the overthrow of Richmond, the whole Southern people, rank

and file, will fall in line and march briskly to the music of the Union. They delude themselves. No doubt a popular reaction in Southern sentiment would follow, but it would be confined to the masses. The instigators and leaders of this accursed war would stand aloof, bent upon mischief long after their power to accomplish it had passed away. The people of the South, at the present moment, consists of two classes: the one, those that are led; the other, those that lead them. Considering that they are following a course that is suicidal to their best interests, we might more properly classify them as, on the one hand, the dupes; and, on the other, the impostors. The relation, in point of numbers, that the latter bear to the former is about one to ten. The mischief that one designing political demagogue can effect with ten such impressible characters as abound in the South has been fully tested, and from the past we can judge of the future. Unless the instigators and leaders of this Rebellion are mollified and reconciled to a return to their allegiance, or unless their power to do evil is destroyed, the dispersion of the rebel army would be of little avail. So long as a discontented and grieved faction could keep their eyes upon their former idols, they would be ripe for sedition. Guerilla warfare would continue, necessitating the maintenance of a standing army, which is opposed to the principles of our republican institutions. A Government that relies upon the supremacy of a military power for a cohesion of its various parts, would not be the Government contemplated by the framers of our Constitution. The only power that can operate with us, is that which proceeds from the consent of the governed.

Are we then to pardon these heinous traitors, that have deluged our once happy country in blood, and inflicted a blow upon our national prosperity, the effect of which will be felt down to the end of the next generation? We answer in the affirmative. We must pardon them, and reconcile them to a reconstruction, or else destroy their power for evil. A Roman emperor or Turkish pasha would rid himself of an enemy to the state by the silent steel or poison, or by execution, but this is the diplomacy of a barbarous age. It would not do for the present day. Many of us remember the feeling occasioned, a half century since, by the exile of Napoleon. Even since then, civilization has made vast strides, and that act, if repeated now, would not be countenanced by the enlightened mind of the present age. Yes! political necessity demands a general amnesty, and to this necessity we must yield, however strong our inclinations may be for a more rigid course.

But condonation does not always heal. Mistaken lenity frequently destroys those that exercise it. What are we then to do? There are two ways, as Lord Bacon has truly said, of overcoming the leaders of a faction: first by pouring honors upon them, to disarm their prejudices and knit them closely to the State; second, by exciting divisions among themselves, and thus distracting the attention of their followers.

The latter course will be the most facile and apposite with us. If the North shows that liberality of mind which rises to the surface upon great occasions, she will, by proper and timely concessions, draw the masses in the South toward her. The masses once united, the power of their former leaders over them becomes weak-

ened, and the leaders themselves will fall to quarrelling without any excitation on our part. A failing cause always gives rise to crimination and recrimination on the part of its adherents, which, when sharpened by the pang of disappointed ambition, ends in mutual destruction.

But to return. We want no patched-up Peace. We must become reunited, never again to be severed. To effectuate this, there must be a reconstruction of the Union upon some broad basis that will allow all sections of the common country the equal and exact justice they were led to expect when they severally ratified the Constitution. We may naturally cling to the old Constitution, and dream that we can live again under it, happy and contented, as in days of yore; but it's all a dream. There must be amendments or additional guarantees.

Hence, when the final blow has been struck, and submission follows, its terms must be agreed upon. An unqualified submission is entirely out of the question; even if we could enforce it, it would be indiscreet to do so. It must be a submission upon terms. When these terms become the subject of discussion, it will be found that the same spirit of concession and magnanimity that animated the framers of our Constitution will be required; and in their adjustment both parties will be influenced by the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed system.

It becomes necessary then to consider the advantages and disadvantages of a reconstruction; whether the former will counterbalance the latter; whether the benefits obtained on each side are worth the concessions they require.

Self-interest is the Archimedean lever that moves the actions of nations as well as men. As man drowns his individual resentment to promote his personal welfare, so nations, that are but an aggregate of men, bury the seed of their discontent that it may fructify and spring up to the National advantage. The same system of reasoning that a solitary individual adopts in the conduct of his worldly affairs, is applicable to a Government. National interest, national pride, and national jealousy are but the reflex of individual interest, individual pride, and individual jealousy. They are as inseparably connected as shadow and substance. We will find, then, that when a reconstruction of the Union becomes the subject of discussion, there will be the same cool, calculating considerations of pros and cons on the part of the delegates that have the matter in charge as is exercised by a single individual in the adoption or rejection of any proposed adventure.

Hence it will become a mere matter of advantage or disadvantage to the respective sections of the country as to whether they will become reunited; and any reasonable, unprejudiced person may correctly anticipate the decision of a convention. If the benefit and injury of any certain course are accurately known, one man, by applying the principle to which we have just alluded, is as competent as a General Assembly to decide the question.

We propose, therefore, to enumerate a few of the most material advantages of a reunion. These may be treated as accruing first to the North; second, to the South; and inasmuch as advantage and disadvantage are correlative terms, the discussion will be simpli-

fied by taking up that term which presents the subject in the strongest light—not forgetting that the affirmation of an advantage in a union implies a disadvantage in a separation.

First, then, argument is supererogatory—an appeal to the selfish interest of our natures is unnecessary, so far as the North is concerned. *We* need no higher incentive to the perpetuation of the Union than that innate love we bear it. *We* love the Government that has made us what we are. The prestige of Union invention, Union enterprise, and Union arms is dear to us. Every link of the sacred chain, commencing in the trying days of our Revolution, continuing on to the present, and losing its end in the unfathomable mists of futurity, is the object of reverential care. The liberty we've enjoyed under our Constitution, and what we've accomplished under the protection of that liberty, cannot be lessened by the tongue of slander, foreign or domestic. The fear of the sober lovers of liberty and the assertions of monarchists (that too much liberty, such as our Constitution guaranteed, would lead to licentiousness—anarchy) have been dissipated by *fact*. As if one could enjoy *too much* liberty! As if we could poison our lungs by the inhalation of too much pure air! Liberty is Power, and power is only unsafe when intrusted to the ignorant; and herein lies our safety. Educate the masses, and liberty is safe. If liberty is the keystone of our Federal arch, education forms its abutments.

To return: We are called upon to enumerate the advantages and disadvantages to the South of a reunion.

Whatever is an advantage in a reunion is a disadvantage in a separation, and *e converso*. The first great

advantage in order, as it is in importance, is PROTECTION to SLAVE PROPERTY.

In the Union, slave property has always been acknowledged—out of it, the right of the slaveowner would not be respected. The South has no reason to believe, nor does she, that in case of separation she can expect the extradition of fugitive slaves. On the contrary, she has every reason to believe, and she does believe, that the incitement to the escape of slaves and the facilities afforded by Northern fanatics, will increase the number of fugitives tenfold. The South cannot count upon the sympathy of the States bordering on her confines, from the fact that they now possess a slave interest. Delaware and Maryland will become Free States, as likewise will Kentucky and Missouri. Kentucky and Missouri would have been rid of slaves fifteen years ago, had it not been for the agitation of this question by the Abolitionists. A State will not be driven from a position, especially one involving a moral doctrine, any sooner than a solitary individual will. History and experience teaches us that error thrives by opposition. Leave it alone, it dies; feed it with opposition, it waxes and grows fat. Thus it was with Mohammedanism. Thus it is with Mormonism. Leave a man alone, and if his instincts are right, he'll abandon error. Thwart him, he'll persist in it, even against his better nature. Such is human nature. Such is political government. Through pride we do things we should not have done, and leave undone things we would have done, had not pride been excited. Virginia must link her destinies with the Northern States. So must Tennessee and North Carolina. A political, geographical, and industrial necessity, stronger

than the mere will of their people, points to this conclusion. The instability and unproductiveness of slave property in Virginia, and the demand for it in the more Southern States, will rid the Old Dominion of the vulture that's preying on her vitals. The demand for slaves can be met only by the supply from Virginia, or the natural increase in this class of population. The latter will not be sufficient. Renewal of slave importation is out of the question. The nations of the world will not allow it. The efforts that have been made for the suppression of the slave traffic will be redoubled in future. There's no hope here. If Virginia finds, as she already has, partially, that her slaves are a drag upon her, and they are constantly escaping, she'll take immediate means to dispose of such precarious property.

The fate of Tennessee and North Carolina is more problematical, but yet we think we can safely affirm that they'll eventually become Free States. They may become so at the eleventh hour; but, imitating the example of the good Master, let their recompense be equal with the rest.

With Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri become Free States, and joined hand in hand as they should be, heart in heart, with the more northern States, what would the so-called Southern Confederacy have to count upon in protection of their fugitive slaves? Perhaps they rely upon the continuing effect of that sympathy which once linked them together. But reflection must tell them different. The common interest they once shared in slaves, severed—the error of their ways seen and abandoned, human nature would display itself as it has in all ages. The proselyte becomes

the enthusiast. We are so strangely, perhaps happily, constituted, that we want others to share our miseries and our joys. If they won't accept our kindly offer, we are so pugnaciously constructed that we immediately resolve to make them. This is persecution! This is bigotry! But yet it exists. The people of the border States, realizing the good flowing from an abolition of slavery, will soon grow to hate, as heartily as they once cherished, the peculiar institution. What they once scorned they'll embrace. The heinous sin of enticing a slave from his master will swell into a sublime virtue. This is the conduct of all proselytes. History proves it! The insecurity of slave property, in case of dissolution, furnishes one of the strongest arguments in favor of union. If to secure the possession of her slaves the South took up arms, she must have been strangely infatuated. She has pursued the most effectual course to lessen their security, and all but the dupes know it. At the commencement of the struggle it was asserted in the Northern press, and but faintly, or not at all, denied in the Southern, that the large slaveowners were the last to yield assent to the new order of things. It was so, and for the very reason we've asserted. The impending sword of exile and confiscation drove many a loyal Southron to the act of expatriation. The foundation of all government is the reciprocal obligation of allegiance and protection. If the United States could not protect the planter, "What duty" (he may have reasoned) "requires me to extend my allegiance? My allegiance is due to the Government that protects me in my rights of property." Under the influence of Confederate terrorism he has acted. But it is not displeasurable to undo an act done

under duress. Once remove the restraint by some decisive victory over rebel arms—not a local, partial success, but one that insures grand, sweeping results—and we'll see such an ebullition of true Union feeling throughout the whole South as will give the fairest glimmerings of the coming dawn.

The second grand advantage to the South in a reunion would be THE SAVING OF THE EXPENSE NECESSARY TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT OF A SEPARATE GOVERNMENT.

The Confederate constitution, to all practical intents and purposes, is similar to our own. They have a president and his cabinet, with their stated salaries; an upper and a lower legislative branch, who receive a recompense for their services. They have Confederate judges, custom house officials, foreign consuls and ministers, and the same agents for carrying on government that we have; and all are to be paid.

They must adopt a postal system, and if it should not be more self-sustaining than the Southern branch proved in the Union system, there will be a heavy annual balance on the wrong side of their national ledger.

If they would maintain the position of an independent power, they must provide and keep a large standing army. They must also build, equip, and maintain a very respectable fleet of armed vessels. Their interior frontier must be zealously guarded by a host of revenue officers. Their harbors must bristle with extensive fortifications, built at enormous expense.

They certainly would not have the temerity to omit these necessary precautions, after having acquired their independence. They would not be so rash as to think

that the North could live peaceably by their side, and calmly behold the expansion of slave power. A new era would dawn. The political dogma of the Old World would be transplanted in the New, and on the floors of Congress and in the counsels of the cabinet would be heard the cry, "The balance of power must be preserved."

Is each of the Southern States going to bear one seventh of this heavy burden, when they can live under a precisely similar Government, with more protection and greater liberty, at an expense of one thirty-fourth? Will they pay ten dollars for what they can get better at two?

It has been asserted that the protective tariff, which was beneficial to Northern States but ruinous to Southern, was one of the causes of this rebellion. As we have shown that security for slave property was not a sufficient reason for their resort to arms, so we now assert that the tariff is equally insufficient. Reduce what the South has lost in any one year by operation of any Federal tariff to dollars and cents. Place beneath the annual cost of administering and supporting a separate Government. Deduct! You can't! Reverse the position of the figures. You have it now. Thus it would appear! the South had better yield to a tariff tenfold as excessive as any we have ever had, rather than submit to the expense of a separate Government.

The next important advantage of a reunion is THE PROCUREMENT OF NORTHERN MANUFACTURES FREE OF DUTY. The South has always prided herself upon being an agricultural people, and her political leaders have held the doctrine that they must "sell dear and

buy cheap." Hence their aversion to a protective tariff. Hence the free trade doctrine, which in American politics is the growth of a Southern climate. Will the cry of "free trade" resound throughout the South, in the event of her independence? We answer, No! most emphatically, No! The political economist of the present day condemns the protective principle. It is wrong. The theory that Government should protect this interest and that interest—literature here, arts there—is exploded. Nevertheless, we venture to affirm that in all *new* countries, and especially so in the South, the protective principle must be initiated and carried out, for a time at least, to encourage home manufactures. The South cannot compete with Northern capital and Northern labor. She must, then, either impose protective duties upon her imports, or, admitting them free, discourage manufactures at home. She must advance or stand still. If the former, she must have a protective tariff; if the latter, she must rely, as heretofore, upon Northern manufactures.

But how can the South manufacture? Slavery shuts out free labor. The negroes are for the soil. Admitting, however, that they would make good factory operatives, every negro so employed is one withdrawn from agricultural pursuits. Agriculture in the South is more profitable than manufacture. Who, then, would divert slave labor from a remunerative channel to an unprofitable one?

The South, then, must yield the championship of free trade, and become the supporters of a ruinous tariff, for the rate will be proportioned to the difference in cost of the foreign and home product. And

here we have a reversal of the Southern doctrine. They will "sell cheap and purchase dear." If the people of the South have been deluded into this war by opposition to the protective tariff principle, they will find that they have put the ball out of one hand only to take it up with the other.

The fourth advantage in a reunion would be THE ABSENCE OF THE EVILS ATTENDANT UPON A GEOGRAPHICAL LINE OF DIVISION. These evils are: 1st, smuggling; 2d, border warfare. The facts of history are too well known to us all to require any remarks upon this topic. The expense necessary to suppress smuggling, when the line of division is inland—in fact, the utter impossibility of doing so—besides the immoral influences of the practice, render it one of the greatest of national evils. So with border warfare. The whole frontier of the two nations would have to be constantly guarded by a numerous army, maintained at an enormous expense. We all have read the history of Scottish border warfare, and from it we can form a faint idea of the precarious tenure of life and property on the frontiers, if this Union is severed. With the Scots, whom a modern English writer of eminence has called "a nation of thieves," the object of crossing the line was simply theft—a drove of cattle secured, a little malicious injury done to spice the affair, and they returned to their homes. Not so would it be with us. Hostile incursions would be inaugurated, not for theft, but to redress some wrong, actual or fancied. A man will rarely destroy life or property when theft is his object; but when retaliation or revenge urges him on, no life or property is secure from his devastating hand. The "inevitable

negro" would be the source of more trouble to both sections after a separation than he was before. Frequent escapes, while they exasperated the South, would deluge the North with that black immigration which many of the States have endeavored to prevent by legislative penalties. The bondman, once impressed with the idea that freedom and himself were separated by but a few miles, would soon gain heart to try and means to effectuate his delivery. The certainty of being pursued would lose its terrors in proportion to the distance to be travelled. Let him but reach the line—he is safe—he is free. The invasion of Northern territory will not become the subject of much reflection by the eager pursuers in the heat of chase. They cross the line, capture the fugitive, and return homeward. But hark! A hue and cry! To the rescue! The pursuers become the pursued. A hundred freemen spring to arms to avenge the desecration of their soil. They pursue! They fight! Blood spilt. The fugitive retaken. Hence spring reprisals, capture and recapture, involving a constant warfare, the atrocities of which will only be equalled by the earnestness of the respective combatants.

The fifth (and last that we will mention) advantage in a reunion, would be THE POWER AND STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT. No one wants to live under a weak or instable government. In proportion to the strength of a government is the protection of the citizen, and in proportion to its stability is the endurance of that protection.

The Southern States have formed what they call a Confederacy. This is not a new idea in history, nor a

new idea in the history of this country. In the convention that framed the Federal Constitution, and in the legislatures of the several States when it was submitted for adoption, the advantages and disadvantages of a confederacy were discussed by the eloquent Henry, the able Madison, the satirical Randolph, the logical Hamilton, the eminent Martin, and the constitutional Marshall—giants in intellect, by the side of whom the leading men in the South are but pigmies; and after a discussion that has not its equal for sound and enlarged views, for eloquence and ability, in the history of the world, a confederacy was almost unanimously condemned.

Its vital defects are weakness and want of duration. What has been the fate of confederacies? In early times we had the Amphictyonic council, the Archæan and Ætolian leagues, and what was *their* fate? Speedy dissolution. The confederacies of more recent times died out in the same manner. Deprived of that coercive principle, without which government is ineffectual or no government at all, they lacked the perpetuating power.

The inherent weakness of the Southern Confederacy is an objectionable feature that would cause its speedy fall. The union of separate sovereignties, under a constitution that allows the connection to be severed at any time, by any one of its integral parts at will, is like passional attraction in the social state, and is just about as durable.

Would that the words of Edmund Randolph, one of the South's most able sons, could be inscribed in letters of gold and read from the banks of the Potomac to those of the Rio Grande! Hear what he says: "To

those that advocate local confederacies and at the same time preach up for republican liberty, I answer, that their conduct is inconsistent; the defence of such partial confederacies will require such a degree of force and expense as will destroy every feature of republicanism."

There is not a man in the South (always excepting the demagogues) but what would prefer a return to the "Union as it was—the Constitution as it is," if he could be made to believe in the truth of history as regards confederacies.

Let our misguided brethren, then, return to us. United, we are strong as the lion; divided, we're weak as the lamb.

From the advantages to the South of a reunion and the disadvantages of separation, a few of the more important of which we have enumerated, we unhesitatingly assert that there is no reason to despair of the Republic. Every one of the reasons we've mentioned is as well known to the leaders of this rebellion as it is to us. All that we ask is their fair agitation among the Southern masses, and reflection will accomplish the rest. It will be perceived that we favor a *voluntary* reunion, to be effected by *force of reason*—not an *involuntary* one, to be accomplished by *force of arms*. What then? Stop fighting! cries some excitable patriot. No, not that! we answer as before. The conservative North is sick at heart with the way in which military matters have been managed. It is not always proper for civilians to criticize military measures, but when such measures are glaringly wrong, it is not amiss to respectfully ask: "Messrs. Commander and General-in-chief, are you sure you're right?" The South has pursued one plan,

and that is Concentration. The North has pursued another plan, and that is Diffusion. The heart of the South beats strong, notwithstanding the blows administered to its extremities. The North, whose business it was to strike straight at the heart, has been thumping about the feet and hands. If we wished to destroy Briareus, would we commence to lop off one after the other of his hundred hands? Yet this has been the military policy of the North. It's wrong. The conservative North proclaims it wrong, and the Administration must heed the proclamation. If the expedition under General Banks, that has just left our shores, has for its object any other than coöperation with General Burnside's forces, it will deserve the deepest denunciation.

Is not the situation of our country now worse than it was in 1781? Our situation was such then, that the powers of a dictator were given to Washington to save us from destruction. Is the country now not worth as much as it was then? If yea, let us make one more attempt to save it, by placing in the hands of our Commander-in-chief the means to vanquish the army before Richmond within three months; but in the name of humanity, let us (like any prudent business man) hold him, *our agent as he is*, to a strict account if he abuses the power we grant. The plea of *public necessity* should be the last to be plead. But let those that use it remember that it is a two-edged sword. If "public necessity" demanded the arrest of the citizen in defiance of the Constitution and the laws, cannot "public necessity," with equal justice, in defiance of the Constitution and the laws, demand the deposition of those who have

abused and continue to abuse the trust reposed in them by the people? This war cannot last to the end of the present Administration. The people will not allow it. What are we then to do?

There are ways in which a speedy settlement could be obtained. History is an eloquent teacher upon this point; and even if she were not, we trust that ardent patriotism would guide us as by instinct Ways—that are harsh and violent, so much so that they would grate upon republican ears and cannot be mentioned. Ways—not to be talked of and considered, but to be acted upon when the time comes. Until that time comes, there is but one way, and that is: by a determined and energetic prosecution of the war by the "powers that be."

Let us then rise in our might to strike one more blow, but *one* only. If a draft is necessary, let it come, but let it be equally and persistently enforced. But there would be no occasion for a draft if the Government would pursue the right policy. Let our forces be concentrated. Recall the troops from the garrison of all places of secondary importance. We abandon a military now, only to acquire a civil possession hereafter. Gather a sufficient force in front of Richmond to overcome all resistance beyond a shadow of doubt. But Washington must be protected. Let the President, then, say to the people of the North: "I have an army before Richmond ready to advance and give the death blow to rebellion. Whilst that army goes forth to fight, I summon all loyal freemen to the defence of our national capital." What would be the response? If Pennsylvania could raise 100,000 vol-

unteers in seven days to defend her soil from the pollution of Rebel arms, what could not the combined North do? Washington guarded, the army advance, and within a week's time, the resting place in this war, for which we all long, is attained.

We have the strongest belief that, after a conclusive battle, a formal, or at any rate a *quasi* submission would follow. Then, on the instant, before the enemy had time to reorganize his scattered forces, before the rancor of defeat could poison his heart, ay, before the dead on the field are entombed, let loose the bird of peace, with its head turned southward, and our word upon it, the faithful messenger would return to the ark of the Union with the olive branch in its beak. Proclaim an amnesty! Call a convention! Set the political cauldron agoing. Throw in free trade and protective tariff side by side; Louisiana sugar against Ohio corn; Alabama cotton against Long Island hay; rice, hemp, and sugar against the manufactures of the New England States. Make way for South Carolina, whilst she cries: "Renewal of the slave trade;" and stand back for Massachusetts as she shrieks: "Down with slavery." Let antidote go with bane. Rake the fire! Stir the medley! Seethe and bubble! Presto! pass! Up springs the tutelary Goddess of our Union—in her outstretched hand the glorious Flag, revealing the gleaming representatives of every State. All there! Not one gone! Is not the picture a glorious one? Is there a man with soul so base as not to feel his heart dilate within him at so desirable a termination of our difficulties? Alas! there is. Not one, but many. Many, yet relatively few. There are those who would trample *actual* liberty

in the dust to relieve *imaginary* oppression; who would commit the *maximum* of evil to accomplish the *minimum* of good. Poor, crazed monomaniacs, that cry out to their deluded followers: "Perish the Constitution! Perish Liberty! Perish the Hope of Ages! Perish everything! But let not Slavery live!" Infatuated souls, that would annihilate God, if they believed Him to differ with themselves upon any trifling point.

The days of bigotry are not over yet. The Roundhead and Puritan survive in their descendants. Persecution for opinion's sake is a weed that grows in our Northern soil as rank and luxuriant as it did in Spanish grounds. It is the weed that has in all ages choked up the good that man would do.

The zeal of the propagandist is usually measured by his ignorance, and his ignorance by his zeal. Of all propagandism in recent times, the anti-slavery of the North has been the most zealous, and therefore the most ignorant. However correct, in the abstract, its tenets may be, the practical results are such as to cause a shudder of horror to every enlightened mind. We are not, for reasons already indicated, one of those who believe the conflicting opinions of the two sections of the country upon the subject of slavery to have been *the only* cause of the present strife. If our opinion upon this point were asked, we would reply, in the words of a respectable merchant of Charleston, South Carolina, of twenty years' standing, who, when solicited by us for his opinion as to the cause of the war, answered: "Good God! my dear friend; every fifth man in the South wants to be President."

Ambition (the sin by which the angels fell) will be

charged by history with her share of this accursed work. And yet, if ambition was the instigator of the war, to the anti-slavery element belongs the honor or dishonor of its prolongation. Were it not for the retarding force brought to bear upon the Administration by the unconditional abolitionists, we believe that the action of the Government would be more energetic—more decisive, less spasmodic. It is to this disastrous pressure that we owe the Confiscation Act and the Emancipation Proclamation; both foolish, unconstitutional measures, that must be, the one repealed, the other withdrawn. The friends of the Administration claim that the Emancipation decree was made in pursuance of the war power vested in the President. War power! what war power? Vested! how vested? when vested? Will some friend of the Administration point us to a declaration of war? There is no such thing. The theory of the Government, laid down in every state paper from the inaugural to the recent message, is that there is a rebellion—no war. Why did we feel so offended at foreign Governments for recognizing the South as belligerents? Because we regarded the taking up of arms as an insurrection. We have either a rebellion or a war. If a rebellion (and the Government has persisted in calling it a rebellion), it must be suppressed by the authorities against whom the rebellion is made, and that, too, in a lawful, constitutional way; for otherwise the Government must confess to an inherent weakness that it is impolitic to own. If this is a war, then the argument about the war power might be urged with some degree of plausibility. But the Administration act as if they desire to maintain this anomalous posi-

tion: so far as neutral nations are concerned, this is a rebellion, and the insurgents are not to be treated as belligerents; so far as our domestic policy is concerned, this is a rebellion or war, as we choose to treat it—therefore the Emancipation decree is all right, being but the exercise of the war power. But can the Government blow hot and cold out of the same mouth, to serve several purposes? Is it fair? Is it honorable? Is not this vacillating, equivocal policy the cause of the forfeiture of the respect of foreign nations?

To whom are we indebted for this detestable policy, that has been at once the source of our foreign complications and the cause of the war's continuance? We answer, to the rabid factionists of the North, who are bent—not upon a restoration of the Union, but upon its destruction, and the establishment of a *military despotism* in its place. Such is the inevitable tendency of their views; whether intentioned or not, is immaterial.

If conquest—subjugation—annihilation—are the objects of this struggle, we cry, in the name of the people, "Stop it!" If, to adopt the language of a leader of this faction, we are "to whip the South, then let them go," we urge the propriety of inquiring into our ability to perform and the good acquired in effecting the chastisement, before we risk the chance of a failure. If, on the other hand, our object is to conquer an honorable and enduring peace, let us go forth and do it. If this struggle eventuates in a harmonious and perpetual reunion, then the lives and treasure so freely given will induce a chastened joy to us and our descendants down to the last syllable of recorded time; but if our brothers, fathers, and husbands have fallen in

a barren cause, and our property, the stay of our life, is swept away by the broom of the exciseman, then indeed will the lamentation of Jeremiah be heard throughout the length and breadth of this once prosperous land.

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